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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DIANE R. DAUTEL, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DAVID F. DAUTEL, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 940130-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant respectfully submits the following brief 
responding to the Brief of Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Husband, while disputing the quantity of Xanax 
taken by Wife and the effect thereof on Wife, concedes that Wife 
suffered from severe anxiety. In paragraph 6 of Husband's 
Statement of Facts, Husband states: " . . . Plaintiff's difficulty 
in making correct decisions was due to her indecisive personality 
disorder, not the medications. . . . " This admission is directly 
relevant to Wife's first point of appeal which is based upon 
Wife's impaired judgment due both to her anxiety condition and 
the effects of medication. 
2. At paragraph 8, Husband erroneously claims to have 
refuted Wife's testimony of harassment by him. Husband's 
authority for such position is a verified reply filed by Husband 
in response to Wife's motion to set aside the stipulation. 
Husband, during his testimony at the hearing, did not contest 
Wife's testimony that Husband had harassed her for a period two 
weeks prior to trial, and that at the settlement meeting the day 
before trial he had thrown books on the table and threatened to 
leave the state or go to jail rather than support his family. (R. 
39, 514, 570, 571) Husband's only testimony related to the issue 
came about indirectly during his adverse examination regarding 
property distribution when he acknowledged that he entered Wife's 
home two or three months after separation and removed items. 
(R. 699) 
Husband's harassment of Wife prior to trial was calculated 
to exploit Wife's anxiety disorder. 
3. At paragraph 8, Husband also claims to have 
personally refuted Wife's impairment. Again, however, Husband's 
cite is to his verified reply, not to (non-existent) testimony 
offered at the hearing. 
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4. At paragraph 9, Husband refers to affidavits filed 
by Wife and her doctor prior to the hearing and alleged 
inconsistencies between those documents and testimony at trial. 
The trial court's oral ruling (R. 728-737) was not based upon 
these matters, but instead rested upon the court's less than firm 
finding that Wife could have consumed all of her prescription of 
Xanax before the date of trial (R. 734-735) and its finding that 
the amount Wife claimed to have taken did not exceed that 
prescribed. (R. 734) Nevertheless, Wife will address matters 
referred to in paragraph 9 of Husband's statement of facts 
seriatim. 
(a) Dr. Wilson's testimony at trial concerning the 
amount of Xanax prescribed varied in favor of Husband's position 
and the testimony regarding the same is duly noted at page 6 of 
Wife's Brief of Appellant. 
While Dr. Wilson noted no problems regarding Wife's use of 
Xanax on March 17, 1993, Wife never contended that she had any 
problem with Xanax at this time. Wife testified that her anxiety 
and consumption of Xanax increased during the period of about two 
weeks prior to trial and her psychologist, Kirk B. Thorn, Ph.D., 
testified that Wife's anxiety increased as trial approached. (R. 
513, 598) It is precisely this distinction between previous low 
use and dramatically increased use of Xanax immediately prior to 
trial upon which Wife's contention of impairment rests. 
3 
(b) The distinction between .5 milligrams every 8 
hours and .5 milligrams every 12 hours at the time the 
prescription was first made is minor and does not materially 
relate to the issues of how much Xanax Wife was allowed to take 
and how much Xanax she had taken immediately prior to the time of 
trial. 
(c)-(f) The distinction between number of pills taken 
versus the number of milligrams taken caused confusion in the 
proceedings. While Wife's testimony regarding the exact number 
of pills taken and the exact number of milligrams contained minor 
variations, the key point of her testimony was that she had 
dramatically increased her intake of Xanax immediately prior to 
trial. Although it can be speculated that Wife could have used 
up her supply of Xanax prior to trial, the fact remains that an 
independent witness testified to giving Wife Xanax the night 
prior to trial. (R. 660) 
Nowhere at trial or in Wife's Brief of Appellant has it been 
represented that Dr. Wilson examined Wife on the day of trial. 
Dr. Wilson testified to the side-effects of Xanax under various 
assumptions. It was left to the Court to apply Dr. Wilson's 




THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN APPROVING, AND 
SUBSEQUENTLY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION 
SINCE WIFE WAS SUFFERING FROM EXTREME ANXIETY AND WAS 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MEDICATION 
A. THREE MONTH TIME PERIOD 
At Page 20 of his brief Husband asserts that Wife's motion 
to set aside the stipulation was untimely because it was not 
brought within three months of the April 28, 1993, trial date. 
Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495 (1983), relied upon by Husband 
recognized that a motion to set aside a decree under Rule 
60(b)(1, 3, 4) must be brought within three months of the date of 
entry of the decree. When Wife filed her motion to set aside the 
stipulation on July 30, 1993, the findings and decree had not yet 
been entered and they were not entered until September 17, 1993. 
Therefore, Wife's motion was timely filed since it was filed four 
and one-half months prior to the required time for filing. 
B. COURT APPROVAL OF STIPULATION 
At pages 22 and 23 of his brief Husband sets forth in detail 
much of the discourse between counsel and the trial court prior 
to the point where Wife gave her confused and reluctant consent 
to the stipulation. The key distinction here is that the lengthy 
recitation of the stipulation occurred before Wife was asked to 
approve the stipulation and responded, "I think so.", "I guess.11, 
"I'm a little iffy on it.", and, "I'm questioning it a little 
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bit, but I guess I'll go along with it." While court and counsel 
may arguendo, have been having a deep and meaningful discussion 
prior to the time Wife was asked to approve the stipulation, such 
discussion has no bearing upon Wife's ability to understand and 
approve the stipulation since she did not take part in this 
discussion and her comments immediately thereafter evidenced 
confusion rather than coherent participation. 
C. ALLEGED FAILURE TO MARSHALL EVIDENCE 
Husband at pages 26 and 27 of his brief tosses up the buzz 
words "failure to marshall evidence" and then raises various red 
herrings in a vain attempt to support this claim. These red 
herrings and Wife's response thereto are: 
1) "Plaintiff was not seen or observed by Dr. Wilson 
or Mr. Thorn the day before trial or the day of trial." Wife's 
brief at no time states or implies that Wife was examined by 
these professionals at these times. On the other hand, Dr. Thorn 
testified that he noted an increase in Wife's anxiety as her 
trial neared and that he had seen her on April 19, 1993. This 
was cited at page 7 of Wife's Brief of Appellant. 
2) "Judge Newey listened to and observed the 
Plaintiff through the entire proceedings ..." Wife at page 15 of 
her brief cited the court's finding that Wife did not appear to 
be impaired at trial. Wife never claimed that the court had not 
had the opportunity to observe her on April 28, 1993. 
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On the other hand, the transcript shows that the trial court 
spent the vast majority of time listening to the attorneys recite 
the stipulation while its conversations with Wife were cursory 
and elicited only short, confused answers of few words from Wife. 
3) "... the testimony of Mr. Thorn and Dr. Wilson was 
based upon speculation and not upon actual observation." This is 
not an accurate characterization of the testimony. Furthermore, 
Wife's brief made no claim that these professionals had examined 
Wife the day of trial. These professionals testified competently 
about what they had observed during their meetings with Wife. 
Dr. Wilson's testimony cited at page 9 of Brief of Appellant was 
not in the form of opinion testimony but merely a statement of 
side-effects associated with Xanax generally. Such testimony was 
competent and available to assist the finder of fact to assess 
the effect increased doses of Xanax could have had upon Wife. 
4) "Plaintiff's first complaint ... came 4 months 
after the court proceedings of April 28, 1993 ..." Wife's brief 
at page 4 advised this Court of the July 30, 1993, date of the 
Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation. Her brief at page 12 
states: "...(the findings and decree) were not signed by the 
court until nearly five months after the date of stipulation. 
(R. 136) In the meantime, Wife concluded that her attorney had 
not protected her rights, obtained new counsel, and filed a 
Motion to Set Aside Stipulation. (R. 137, 142)" 
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Wife moved to withdraw her stipulation over one and one-half 
months before the findings and decree were entered while disputes 
continued between the parties over the drafting of the findings 
of fact and decree. Therefore, Wife's withdrawal of her consent 
to the stipulation was not only timely but four and one-half 
months prior to the three month deadline in which to file a 
motion to set aside. 
Husband's problems with Wife's brief relate to arguing the 
facts, not setting them forth. The material facts are cited in 
Wife's brief. Wife has no duty to argue Husband's case for him. 
D. FAILURE TO CONSIDER INCREASED CONSUMPTION OF XANAX 
Husband's brief parallels the trial court's failure to consider 
the issue of sudden increased consumption of Xanax. Both 
Husband's brief and the trial court's ruling (R. 734) emphasized 
that the amount of Xanax Wife testified to have taken during the 
period prior to trial would have been within the maximum amount 
allowed over a 24 hour period. However, neither Husband's brief 
nor the trial court's ruling responds to Dr. Wilson's testimony 
that a substantial increase in the usage of Xanax over a 24 to 48 
hour period will cause individuals to "not think well at all." 
E. SEVERE ANXIETY DISORDER ACKNOWLEDGED 
At paragraph 6 of his statement of facts, Husband states, 
"... Plaintiff's difficulty in making correct decisions was due 
to her indecisive personality disorder, not the medications...." 
This statement acknowledges that Wife's anxiety was greatly 
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beyond the form of tension that typically accompanies litigation 
and is consistent with Dr. Thorn's testimony that Wife "becomes 
pretty confused at times and really indecisive and that's the 
symptom of the depression that she was experiencing."(R. 515) 1 
Wife's first point for appeal is based upon her impairment 
from both her extreme anxiety and the effect of the medication. 
The confirmed severe anxiety together with the dramatically 
increased consumption of Xanax resulted in Wife's confused and 
tentative responses to the trial court when asked if she agreed 
to the stipulation. While it may be argued as to which factor 
most affected her capacity to make proper decisions, the fact 
remains that Wife's judgment was clearly impaired and Wife should 
have been allowed to withdraw from the stipulation. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
ENTER SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT JUSTIFYING ALIMONY, 
CHILD SUPPORT AND PROPERTY AWARDS 
Husband's reply brief does not effectively defend the trial 
court's failure to make subsidiary findings as required by Lee v. 
Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah App. 1987). Husband's reliance on 
Larson v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (1984) to contend that no specific 
findings were necessary is misplaced since Larson predated Lee, 
and involved a default judgment in a paternity action rather than 
^hile suffering from her anxiety disorder, Wife had been 
required to deal with Husband's change of sexual preference, her 
extreme fear of acquiring AIDS and Husband's harassment prior to 
trial. (R. 39, 132, 513, 514, 570, 514, 516) 
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a divorce settlement. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Larson 
reversed part of the judgment because of the trial court's 
judgment failure to take evidence and make findings, id. at 56. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN APPROVING, AND 
SUBSEQUENTLY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE, INEQUITABLE AWARDS 
OF ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT AND PROPERTY. 
Point II of Husband's Reply Brief fails to respond to the 
obvious inequities set forth in Wife's brief regarding the 
property settlement. No rational explanation is given as to why 
alimony was set so low, why Wife should have waived her claim for 
accrued and unpaid temporary alimony, why Wife should have 
accepted less than half of the marital estate by conceding a 
$7,000 "equalization" payment to Husband as well as her claim to 
Husband's 401K plan and why Husband should not have been ordered 
to pay Wife's attorney's fees. 
The agreement was unconscionable and must be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
Wife must be awarded the relief requested in her Brief of 
Appellant. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^ ^  day of October, 1994. 
NEIL B. CRIST 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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